

# Safety assurance of automated driving systems. Raising the level of ambition


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# Assessment of ADS safety in GRVA/VMAD\*



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Commission



# Example: ALKS Regulation 157

- Requirements. The activated system shall:
  - comply with traffic rules
  - not cause any collisions reasonably foreseeable and preventable



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#### **Operational requirement**

- not cause any collisions reasonably foreseeable and preventable
- adapt the speed to adjust the distance to a vehicle in front in the same lane to be equal or greater than the minimum following distance.

Present speed of the ALKS vehicle		Minimum time gap	Minimum following distance
(km/h)	(m/s)	(s)	(m)
7.2	2.0	1.0	2.0
10	2.78	1.1	3.1
20	5.56	1.2	6.7
30	8.33	1.3	10.8
40	11.11	1.4	15.6
50	13.89	1.5	20.8
60	16.67	1.6	26.7



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#### Performance requirement


 avoid a collision with a cutting in vehicle if If the cutting in vehicle is 30 cm inside the lane and

$$TTC > \frac{u_{rel}}{6*2} + 0.35 s$$



# Effect of operational requirements. Example

#### Traffic fundamental diagram



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### JRC recommendation

Focus on performance rather than behavioural/operational requirements


 Combine different approaches in a transparent way to set the performance level (human behaviour, technological capability, physical boundaries)

 Adopt a statistical approach to assess the requirements (models are not perfect)



## Comparison between RSS and VMAD Driver

#### Unpreventable scenarios



- Unpreventable scenario are those where both the validated driver model and the safety envelope approach produce an accident
- An ADS cannot be less safe than a human and shall take advantage of the available technologies



#### Conclusions

- Setting operational requirements can induce negative effects on traffic flow which are difficult to be foreseen and can limit technlogical capability to improve both safety and traffic efficiency
- Performance requirements have to be set in a transparent and credible way to clearly define the level of ambition for future Ads. Different approach can be combined in order to exploit their benefits and cope with their limitations
- Performance requirements should be used to **define accident probability** on the set of scenarios used rather than to define which scenario is preventable
- A safety margin should be used to define of how much an ADS should be safer than a human driver supported by state-of-the-art technologies



# Thank you



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